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Abstract
We study the differential impacts of public and private sources of health spend-
ing on health outcomes using a triple difference approach. We find that private
health spending has on average a higher health-promoting effect than public health
spending. This result is robust with respect to the choice of outcome measure and
covariates in the regression and driven primarily by the countries with ineffective
governments. Once we restrict our sample to countries with effective governments,
private health spending is no better than public health spending for improving the
health outcome.
JEL classification codes: I10, I15, I18
Keywords: Child mortality rate, Life expectancy at birth, Health spending, Government
effectiveness, Triple difference
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, the overall health status of people around the world have
significantly improved. On average, people live longer than ever before, regardless of
their income level. In high income countries (HIC), the life expectancy at birth (LEAB)
has increased from about 70 years in 1970 to around 80 in 2010 (Figure 1(a)). During
the same period, low income countries (LIC) and middle income countries (MIC) have
achieved an even larger increase in LEAB. Similarly. the under-five mortality rate (U5MR)
has dropped substantially. This improvement is particularly apparent in LIC and MIC
(Figure 1(b)).
There are a few (plausible) reasons for this remarkable improvement. First, the ad-
vancement of medicine has enabled the prevention and treatment of diseases that were
previously not possible. Second, higher standards of living have also contributed to the
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improvement in health as people can get more and better food and clean and safe drinking
water. For example, Pritchett and Summers (1996) found that richer people tend to be
healthier and live longer on average. Finally, richer people and people in richer coun-
tries also tend to enjoy better public health and sanitation and receive better education,
which in turn help people to avoid contracting preventable diseases and live a healthier
life overall.
However, there are considerable variations in health across individuals and countries
even at a similar level of income. For example, according to the World Development
Indicators (WDI) compiled by the World Bank, the highest and lowest LEAB in 2010
among upper middle income countries were 79.2 (Costa Rica) and 53.1 (Botswana) years,
respectively, even though the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of Botswana in
purchasing power parity exceeds that of Costa Rica. Thus, it is clear that higher income
alone cannot guarantee healthier life.
One obvious question that arises here is what other factors affect health outcomes.
There are indeed a number of factors that potentially affect health. Some factors are
difficult to change by policy at least in the short run. For example, the diet varies
substantially across countries even at a similar level of income and it affects the health of
a nation. The disease environment is also different from place to place even for countries
at a similar level of income. On the other hand, policy-makers may be able to control
their country’s health financing, at least to a certain degree. Thus, we investigate whether
and how different sources of health spending affect health outcomes.
This is an important research question. According to the World Health Organization
(2010), 20-40 percent of health resources are being wasted at a conservative estimate.
This is clearly an important problem for poor countries, because they cannot afford to
waste any resources. It is also an important problem for rich countries because the health
expenditure share in GDP tends to be higher for richer countries as shown in Section 3.
Hence, efficient provision of health-care services is critical for both rich and poor countries.
One important source of health financing is public health expenditure. It is an im-
portant source because it can potentially improve the health of millions of people, who
2
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Figure 1: The changes in (a) life expectancy at birth in years (top) and (b) under-five
child mortality rate in the number of deaths per thousand live births (bottom) over time
(Source: World Development Indicators).
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are prevented from receiving health care by the obligation to pay directly at the moment
of need (World Health Organization, 2010). Public involvement is also desirable when
the consumption of health-care services entail positive externalities, as is the case for
the immunization for vector-borne diseases, or when the government can mitigate the
information asymmetry in the health sector, for example, between doctors and patients.
However, government intervention can lead to inefficient health-care provision when
it interferes with the incentive structure. Another potential issue with the government
intervention is that it is often inequitable as the non-poor are typically the main beneficia-
ries of free or subsidized health care, which tends to be available only in urban hospitals.
This issue is particularly salient in developing countries. Even if services are available in
every area, wealthier people may benefit more from health care provided by the govern-
ment because they can afford the travel and time costs (Musgrove, 1996). Government
spending may also be inefficient in the presence of corruption, because the government
health-care payments may be diverted for other purposes.
Another important source of health financing is private health expenditure, which
includes out-of-pocket expenditure and private health insurance among others. Out-of-
pocket expenditure has a desirable property from the efficiency perspective under some
assumptions. That is, consumers (patients) have an incentive to pay health-care expenses
out of pocket only when the private marginal cost of health care is no greater than the
private marginal benefit. Thus, non-negligible out-of-pocket payment helps to prevent
excess use of medical services (Ellis and McGuire, 1993).
Private health insurance allows individuals to share the risk of unexpected medical
costs and allow them to receive expensive but rarely needed life-saving health-care services
when they are necessary. While publically provided health insurance also fulfills the
same purpose and over-utilization and cost escalation can be a concern even for private
insurance (e.g., Psacharopoulos and Nguyen (1997)), private insurance companies have
a direct financial incentive to keep the payments for unnecessary medical treatments in
check. Therefore, in the absence of information asymmetry, externality, and other market
failures, private sources of health expenditure are likely to be more efficiently used than
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public sources.
In reality, however, various forms of market failures exist and they are far from neg-
ligible. The information asymmetry between doctors and patients is well known. Partly
for this reason, markets for health-care services are normally regulated. Similarly, adverse
selection and moral hazard in the private health insurance market can also be a serious
problem.
The discussion above indicates that the impact of health spending on health outcomes
is likely to vary with the source of health spending. Because public and private sources
have different strengths and weaknesses, which source has a more positive health effect is
an empirical question. Therefore, we investigate this question using a cross-country panel
data set that covers almost all the countries and areas in the world. As we elaborate in
Section 2, there are many studies that look at the difference between private and public
ownership of hospitals. However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically
link private and public sources of health financing directly to health outcomes around the
world over a long time horizon.
One of the possible reasons why previous study on this topic is nonexistent is because
the identification of the effect of different sources of health expenditure is difficult because
health expenditure is endogenous. That is, people may live longer because they have more
and better health care. However, at the same time, they may need to allocate a higher
share of their incomes to health care because they live longer.
We tackle the endogeneity issue by triple difference, or difference in differences in
differences, where the differences are taken along the dimensions over time, share of health
spending in GDP, and private share in health spending. This approach allows us to isolate
the effect of different mix of private and public sources for health spending from the total
amount of health spending as a share of GDP. As we elaborate subsequently, our triple
difference approach plausibly allows us to identify the effect of private source of health
expenditure relative to public expenditure.
Our main finding is that health spending on average tends to have a higher health-
promoting effect when it comes from a private source than when it comes from a public
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source. However, this difference is primarily driven by the presence of countries in which
the government is ineffective. When we analyze the subsample of countries with effective
governments, we do not find any evidence that private sources of health spending have a
higher health-promoting effect. Given that the public share in health spending has been
increasing over the last two decades as shown in Section 3, it is important to consider
carefully whether this general trend is desirable.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review relevant studies. In
Section 3, we describe the data and some measurement issues. To convey the basic idea
behind the triple difference approach, we start with a na¨ıve version in Section 4, where
all the three dimensions along which differences are taken are dichotomized. Then, we
consider various regression versions of triple difference in Section 5, which allow us to
explicitly take into account different levels of health spending share in GDP and private
share in health spending. We offer some discussion and policy implications in Section 6.
2 Review of related literature
One of the first studies on the relationship between health inputs and health outcomes
is Auster et al. (1969). Estimating cross-state regression models in the United States,
they find that medical care is related to better health (age-adjusted mortality), though
environmental variables are found to be far more important. Using data for six OECD
countries, Wolfe (1986) finds that health-care expenditures bear a positive relationship to
health status once the life-style variables such as smoking and drinking are controlled for.
A number of subsequent studies also find a positive relationship between health inputs
and health outcomes. Hitiris and Posnett (1992) find that lower mortality rates are
associated with higher total health spending per capita after controlling for, among others,
GDP per capita. Using a panel data for ten Canadian provinces over 15 years, Cre´mieux
et al. (1999) find that lower health spending is associated with a statistically significant
increase in infant mortality and a decrease in life expectancy. Anand and Ba¨rninghausen
(2004) find a significant and positive relationship between the density of human resources
for health (i.e., doctors and nurses) and health outcomes. Similarly, Martin et al. (2008)
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find that the marginal cost of a life year saved is quite low and challenge the view that
health care has little marginal impact on health.
However, these results are far from overwhelming. Using a cross-country data for 117
countries, Kim and Moody (1992) find that health resource measures do not have signif-
icant explanatory power of the variations in infant mortality rates, once socioeconomic
resources that have impact on health—such as income, food consumption, education, and
access to safe water—are controlled for. Their findings are consistent with Filmer and
Pritchett (1999), who find that the impact of public spending on child mortality and infant
mortality are small, even though their finding was challenged by Hanmer et al. (2003).
McGuire (2006) finds that developing countries with more health spending do not have
systematically lower U5MR, whereas countries with better infant health-care services do.
Nixon and Ulmann (2006) also find that the contribution of health-care expenditure to
health was small in the 15 EU countries over the period 1980-1995.
The discussion above indicates that the relationship between health inputs and outputs
is far from obvious. It is indeed not very surprising to have these apparently conflicting
results. On one hand, a higher health spending may lead to a better health outcome
if health-care services directly improve the health status of individuals. On the other
hand, the healthiest people are generally those people who do not need to spend much on
health care. Therefore, it is a priori not clear whether the health spending is positively
or negatively related to health outcomes.
While we also study the relationship between health input and output, our study is
different from the above-mentioned studies in three aspects. First, we clearly distinguish
between private and public sources of health spending. In this sense, our study is related
to Self and Grabowski (2003), who find that disability-adjusted life expectancy tends
to increase with public health spending but not with private health spending in middle
and less developed countries in their cross-country regressions. However, they do not
appropriately account for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries. A similar issue
exists in Anand and Ravallion (1993), who run a regression of shortfall of life expectancy
on public, but not private, health spending per capita, among others. Kennelly et al.
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(2003) include the share of public health spending in the total health spending in their
regression analysis but omit the total health expenditure in the regression. Therefore, an
increased private health expenditure would not affect the health outcome at all in Anand
and Ravallion (1993) and only through the decreased share of public spending on health
in Kennelly et al. (2003), both of which appear implausible. In contrast to these studies,
we control for the total health expenditure as a share of GDP, among others, to estimate
the differential impacts of private and public health spending on health outcomes.
Second, we use a panel data set for our regression analysis, which allows us to control
for the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across countries. While there have been
a few studies that use a panel data, we cover a longer period of time and a larger number
of countries such that this study does not suffer from the concern for over-fitting unlike
some other studies.
Finally, we take into account the quality of the government in our analysis. Because
the effects of health expenditure from public sources are likely to depend on how the
government manages its spending, the quality of government is likely to matter. Despite
this apparent importance, little attention was paid to the government quality in the cross-
country analysis of health expenditures and health outcomes. Therefore, we explicitly
incorporate the government quality into our analysis. Indeed, our empirical analysis
shows that the quality of government matters significantly.
This study further relates to three strands of literature. First, it relates to a large body
of literature on the relationship between the hospital ownership and its performance. In
this literature, private and pubic hospitals are compared by some performance measures
often using the data envelopment analysis (DEA). For example, Chang et al. (2004) find
that private hospitals have a higher operating efficiency than public hospitals in Taiwan
using DEA. Similarly, Tiemann and Schreyo¨gg (2012) find that the conversions from pub-
lic to private for-profit status were a associated with an increased in efficiency in Germany.
In Bangladesh, private hospitals were perceived to be better on responsiveness, communi-
cation, and discipline based on a survey dataset (Andaleeb, 2000). On the other hand, in
the US, public hospitals are found more efficient than private hospitals (Hollingsworth et
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al., 1999; Hollingsworth, 2003, 2008). Even in the same country, the relative efficiency of
private and public hospitals is mixed (see Tiemann et al. (2012) for the case of Germany).
By bringing the unit of analysis to a country, we complement this literature.
Second, this study is relevant to a large body of literature on the determinants of health
spending (e.g., Fuchs (1990); Gerdtham (1992); Gerdtham et al. (1992); Di Matteo and Di
Matteo (1998); and Newhouse (1987, 1992)). A common observation in this literature is
that health-care expenditure rises faster than aggregate income per capita and that income
per capita is the most important determinant of health spending.1 Thus, compared with
poorer nations, wealthier nations tends to spend more than proportionately on health
care, a point that is sometimes taken as evidence for the assertion that health care is a
luxury good. While we do not try to prove or disprove this assertion, we contribute to this
literature by underscoring the importance of the distinction between private and public
sources and between out-of-pocket and other private sources.
Third, this study also contributes to the body of literature on the role of private sector
in the provision of health-care services. Berman and Rose (1996) study the role of private
sector in meeting the needs for maternal and child health in 11 developing countries and
find that public sector tends to play a more significant role in the provision of health-
care services with public-goods property (e.g., immunization of infectious diseases) than
health-care services that can be considered private goods (e.g., treatment of diarrhea and
acute respiratory infections). On the other hand, Bojalil et al. (1998) report that the
quality of private general practitioners are worse than public ones, which may be because
of the poor quality control of physicians. A similar finding is made in Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru (Waters et al., 2008).
Therefore, even though the importance of private sector engagement in health care is
well recognized (See, for example, Bustreo et al. (2003)) and private health-care providers
already coexist with public ones in many poor countries (Meessen et al., 2011), it is
not clear on balance how private and public sources of health financing perform from
1A notable exception is Sen (2005). He finds that the income elasticity of health expenditure is well
less than unity once year- and country-specific factors and other demand and supply factors and are
controlled for.
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the perspective of improving health outcomes. This research answers this question by
explicitly distinguishing between private and public sources of health spending.
3 Data
The primary data source for this study is the World Development Indicators (WDI)
compiled by the World Bank.2 The WDI database covers a number of country-level
variables including health outcome variables, health spending from various sources, and
other covariate such as GDP per capita. Although the time-series dimension of the WDI
starts from 1960, the health spending data in the WDI database are available only from
1995. Therefore, this study will focus on the two decades starting from 1995. We shall
call the 1995-2004 and 2005-2014 periods the first and second decades, respectively.
We use the life expectancy at birth (LEAB) taken from the WDI database as the
main measure of overall health status, where the LEAB represents the number of years a
newborn infant would live if the prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth
were to stay the same throughout its life. We chose to use the LEAB as the main health
outcome variable for three reasons. First, the LEAB is available every year or almost
every year in many countries and regions in recent years. Because it is calculated from
the mortality of all age groups, it reflects the health of people for all age groups rather
than certain specific groups, which other common health measures such as the mortality
rate for children under five (U5MR) do not possess. This point is important because the
WDI database contains only aggregated data for health spending rather than spending
targeted at specific age groups. For this reason, we take LEAB as the main health outcome
of interest.
We also take some covariates from the WDI database. The main variables of interest
in this database are the following variables: the health expenditure share in GDP (HESH)
and private health expenditure share (PRHS), which is calculated as one minus the share
of public sources in the total health expenditure. HESH is slightly positively correlated
2http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators accessed on July
15, 2017. We use the version updated on July 1, 2017.
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Table 1: Key summary statistics
Variable 1994-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014
Life expectancy at birth 66.20 67.23 68.82 70.46
(LEAB, years)∗ (9.88) (10.05) (9.45) (8.72)
Health expenditure share in GDP 5.78 6.03 6.32 6.66
(HESH, %)∗ (2.36) (2.29) (2.40) (2.57)
Private health share in total health 44.13 43.95 43.00 41.54
expenditure (PRHS, %)∗ (19.81) (19.73) (19.55) (18.52)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 8.78 8.89 9.04 9.13
(PPP, const 2011 US dollar) (1.22) (1.24) (1.24) (1.20)
Share of population with access 81.61 83.50 85.64 87.71
to improved water source (%) (19.09) (17.64) (16.23) (15.03)
Under five mortality rate 61.21 52.45 43.15 35.59
(U5MR, per 1,000 live birth)∗ (62.13) (53.43) (44.07) (36.30)
Number of observations 179 182 179 179
Note: the sample standard deviation is reported in parentheses below the mean. The
number of observations apply to those variables followed by an asterisk (∗). The number
of observations for other variables is slightly smaller due to missing values.
with GDP per capita whereas PRHS is negatively correlated with GDP per capita as
shown in Figure 2.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the key variables mentioned above. It
shows that LEAB and U5MR improved over time as already discussed earlier. It also
shows that the income level and access to water went up around the world. At the
same time, HESH has increased over time, reflecting the fact that people live longer and
that older people tend to need more health-care services. On the other hand, PRHS
dropped over time, which indicates the trend for a higher public involvement in health-
care services. As the large standard deviation of PRHS and Figure 2(b) indicate, there is
a large variation in PRHS across countries. Therefore, it is both interesting and important
to understand how the private share matters for health outcomes.
Along with these health expenditure indicators, we also consider other covariates that
are found to be important determinants of health status in previous studies. The choice
of covariate are also partly driven by the availability of relevant data annually. Arguably
the most essential covariate is the income, for which we use the GDP per capita adjusted
for purchasing power parity and expressed in constant international dollars. Further, as a
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Figure 2: The scatter plot between (a) health expenditure share in GDP (top) and (b)
private health share (bottom) against the logarithmic GDP per capita in the year 2010.
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proxy for the public health conditions, we use the proportions of population with access
to improved water source.
It is likely that the relative impact of public and private sources of heath spending
depends on the quality of government. Therefore, as a proxy for the quality of government,
we use the Government Effectiveness (GE) compiled in the World Governance Indicators
compiled by the World Bank.3 GE captures perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2010). GE is available every two years
between 1996 and 2002 and every year after 2002.
4 Na¨ıve Triple Difference
We start with a na¨ıve version of triple difference analysis to convey the basic idea behind
the triple difference approach. In this analysis, we dichotomize all the dimensions along
which difference is taken. To this end, we first collapse the data over the time dimension to
the first and second decades (i.e., the decade before and after 2005, respectively) by taking
the average over each decade for each country or area.4 We classify each country into either
a low HESH country or a high HESH country based on whether the country’s HESH before
2005 is below or above the median HESH in this period.5 We also classify each country
into either a high PRHS country or a low PRHS country in a similar manner. Therefore,
we categorize each observation into one of the eight categories defined by before/after
2005, low/high HESH, and low/high PRHS. We then take the difference along each of
these dimension to obtain triple difference.
In Table 2, we report the average LEAB for each of these eight categories and take
the differences. Panel (A) focuses on the countries in which the private share in health
spending is low. The left column (“Low health share”) in this panel shows the average
3http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi accessed on July 15, 2017. We use the version up-
dated on September 23, 2016.
4Hereafter, we simply call country unless the distinction is relevant.
5The median country is categorized in the high category.
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Table 2: Average life expectancy at birth (LEAB) by the level of health expenditure
share in GDP (HESH) and the level of private health expenditure share in the total
health expenditure (PRHS) for years before and after 2005 (all countries).
Low HESH High HESH Difference
(A) Low PRHS
1995-2004 66.46 74.35 7.89***
(1.36) (0.77) (1.56)
2005-2014 69.26 76.86 7.59***
(1.25) (0.73) (1.45)
Change 2.80*** 2.50*** -0.30
(0.33) (0.18) (0.38)
# Countries 40 49 89
(B) High PRHS
1995-2004 62.26 62.49 0.24
(1.26) (1.80) (2.20)
2005-2014 65.82 66.12 0.30
(1.11) (1.60) (1.94)
Change 3.57*** 3.63*** 0.06
(0.37) (0.46) (0.59)
# Countries 49 41 90
(C) Difference between (A) and (B)
1995-2004 -4.21** -11.86*** -7.65***
(1.86) (1.95) (2.70)
2005-2014 -3.44** -10.73*** -7.29***
(1.67) (1.76) (2.42)
Change 0.77 1.13** 0.36
(0.50) (0.50) (0.70)
Note: The standard errors calculated from a regression
of LEAB for each country and each decade on the indi-
cator variables for each combination of pre/post-2005
period, low/high HESH and low/high PRHS without a
constant and clustered for each country are reported in
the parentheses below the point estimates. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ in the cells for differences (i.e., “Change” rows and
“Difference” column in Panels (A) and (B) as well as
all cells in Panel (C)) denote that the point estimate is
statistically different from zero at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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LEAB for the countries with low health share in GDP. Therefore, the average LEAB for
countries with low HESH and low PRHS increased from 66.46 years in the first decade
(1995-2004) to 69.26 years in the second decade (2005-2014) by 2.80 years as reported
in the third row (“Change”), which is statistically significant by a two-sided t-test. The
next column (“High health share”) shows that the average LEAB for countries with high
HESH and low PRHS increased from 74.35 years to 76.86 years by 2.50 years, which is
again statistically significant. The improvement in LEAB over time is observed across
different categories of countries.
The last column (“Difference”) takes the difference between low and high HESH coun-
tries. There is a significant difference in LEAB between low and high PRHS countries
but as the bottom right corner of panel (A) shows, the double difference (or difference-in-
differences) estimate of the impact of high health expenditure share relative to low health
expenditure share is insignificant.
One has to be cautious when making a causal inference here. Even though the point
estimate is negative, the initial condition for low and high HESH countries appear to be
very different. The high HESH countries tend to be wealthier as shown in Figure 2(a) and
thus the LEAB in these countries tends to be high in the first place. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the incremental increase in LEAB may be lower for high HESH country
if, for example, the increase in the standards of living is slower for these countries due to
convergence in economic growth. Therefore, the negative double difference estimate may
not be driven by the causal effect of high health expenditure but the negative correlation of
the initial standards of living with subsequent economic growth and increment in LEAB.
Panel (B) is similar to panel (A) except that it focuses on the countries in which the
private share in the total health expenditure is high. The double difference estimate in
this case is slightly positive (0.06 years) but the point estimate is very close to zero. Given
that the initial LEAB is similar between the low and high HESH countries, we would not
need to worry about the convergence discussed above. Therefore, if we are willing to make
a causal inference, the double difference estimate indicates that the impact of high health
spending is essentially zero.
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Panel (C) takes the difference between panels (A) and (B). For example, among low
HESH countries, there is -3.44(=65.82-69.26) years of difference in the average LEAB
between the countries with high and low PRHS in the second decade (2005-2014). The
last row (“Difference”) can be interpreted as a double-difference estimate of the impact of
moving from low to high private health expenditure share given the level of health share
in GDP. This impact is not significant in countries where health spending is low but it is
positive and significant where health spending is high.
The bottom right corner of panel (C) reports the triple difference. This number is posi-
tive, suggesting that the private health spending on average has a higher health-promoting
effect than the same amount of public health spending. However, we cannot draw a strong
conclusion because the triple difference estimate is not statistically significant.
Table 2 uses all countries and thus do not take into account the quality of government.
To take into account government quality, we classify countries whose GE indicator is on
average negative [positive] over the first decade as low- [high-] GE countries and redo the
na¨ıve triple difference. We report the same table as Table 2 with a subsample of low- and
high-GE countries in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
Each cell in Panel (A) of Table 3 has the same sign as the corresponding cell in Table 2.
However, the countries with ineffective governments are generally poorer countries and
the LEAB is generally lower. The double difference estimator of the impact of high
health expenditure share is negative (-0.84 years) and marginally significant for low-GE
low-PRHS countries.
As Panel (B) shows, among low-GE high-PRHS countries, the average LEAB for high
HESH countries is marginally lower than that for low HESH countries for both decades
as “Difference” column indicates. The double difference estimator of the impact of high
health expenditure share is positive (0.52 years) but insignificant. As a result, the triple
difference estimator is positive as the bottom right corner of Panel (C) shows. While the
point estimate (1.36 years) is insignificant, this is moderately large.
Let us now compare Tables 3 and 4. The signs of the first difference with respect to
time (as shown in “Change” rows in Panels (A) and (B)) and the first difference with
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Table 3: Average life expectancy at birth (LEAB) by the level of health expenditure
share in GDP (HESH) and the level of private health expenditure share in the total
health expenditure (PRHS) for years before and after 2005 (low-GE countries only).
Low HESH High HESH Difference
(A) Low PRHS
1995-2004 62.52 69.70 7.18***
(1.72) (1.18) (2.08)
2005-2014 65.38 71.72 6.34***
(1.62) (1.20) (2.02)
Change 2.86*** 2.02*** -0.84*
(0.44) (0.15) (0.47)
# Countries 23 10 33
(B) High PRHS
1995-2004 60.70 59.44 -1.27
(1.27) (2.03) (2.39)
2005-2014 64.43 63.68 -0.74
(1.09) (1.79) (2.10)
Change 3.72*** 4.24*** 0.52
(0.41) (0.55) (0.69)
# Countries 43 31 74
(C) Difference between (A) and (B)
1995-2004 -1.82 -10.27*** -8.45***
(2.14) (2.34) (3.17)
2005-2014 -0.96 -8.04*** -7.09**
(1.96) (2.15) (2.91)
Change 0.86 2.23*** 1.36
(0.60) (0.57) (0.83)
Note: The standard errors calculated from a regression
of LEAB for each country and each decade on the indi-
cator variables for each combination of pre/post-2005
period, low/high HESH and low/high PRHS without a
constant and clustered for each country are reported in
the parentheses below the point estimates. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ in the cells for differences (i.e., “Change” rows and
“Difference” column in Panels (A) and (B) as well as
all cells in Panel (C)) denote that the point estimate is
statistically different from zero at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Average life expectancy at birth (LEAB) by the level of health expenditure
share in GDP (HESH) and the level of private health expenditure share in the total
health expenditure (PRHS) for years before and after 2005 (high-GE countries only).
Low HESH High HESH Difference
(A) Low PRHS
1995-2004 71.25 75.72 4.47***
(1.41) (0.85) (1.65)
2005-2014 74.00 78.50 4.50***
(0.92) (0.73) (1.18)
Change 2.75*** 2.79*** 0.04
(0.55) (0.19) (0.58)
# Countries 16 37 53
(B) High PRHS
1995-2004 73.38 71.96 -1.42
(1.24) (1.87) (2.24)
2005-2014 75.83 73.69 -2.14
(1.68) (2.27) (2.82)
Change 2.45*** 1.73*** -0.72
(0.53) (0.50) (0.73)
# Countries 6 10 16
(C) Difference between (A) and (B)
1995-2004 2.13 -3.76* -5.88**
(1.88) (2.06) (2.78)
2005-2014 1.83 -4.81** -6.65**
(1.91) (2.38) (3.06)
Change -0.29 -1.06* -0.76
(0.77) (0.54) (0.94)
Note: The standard errors calculated from a regression
of LEAB for each country and each decade on the indi-
cator variables for each combination of pre/post-2005
period, low/high HESH and low/high PRHS without a
constant and clustered for each country are reported in
the parentheses below the point estimates. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ in the cells for differences (i.e., “Change” rows and
“Difference” column in Panels (A) and (B) as well as
all cells in Panel (C)) denote that the point estimate is
statistically different from zero at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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respect to the health share (as shown in the first two rows of “Difference” column in these
panels) are the same. However, the sign of the double difference estimator in each of these
panels are flipped.
Next, compare the double difference estimators at the bottom of Panel (C) in Tables 3
and 4. They can be interpreted as the impact of high private health share if we allow
causal interpretation. They are positive in Table 3 but negative in Tables 4 even though
the point estimate is insignificant for low-HESH countries. This comparison suggests that
the effect of private source of health spending relative to public source on the health
outcome is dependent on the government quality.
As the comparison of the bottom right corner of Panel (C) between Tables 3 and
4 indicates, the sign of the triple difference estimator is also the opposite. If we take
the quadruple difference, or the difference in the triple difference estimates between the
two tables, the point estimate is negative (-2.13 years) and marginally significant at a 10
percent level. If we allow causal interpretation, the effect of high private health spending
share for low-GE countries is lower than that for high-GE countries by 2.13 years of
LEAB.
The points above indicate that there may be a differential causal effect of health
spending on health outcome between private and public sources. However, we have to be
cautious not to over-interpret the results because we do not control for the characteristics
that may be correlated with the health outcome. Therefore, we also consider below
regression versions of triple difference estimation. In the regression analysis, we will take
the health spending share in GDP and private health expenditure share in the total
health expenditure instead of dichotomizing them. This is important because it allows us
to exploit the variations within each category (i.e., low/high HESH and low/high PRHS)
such that we may be able to identify the differential effect between private and public
sources of health spending more sharply.
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5 Regression-based Triple Difference Estimation
Baseline results
In our baseline regression analysis, we use a lustrum, or a five-year interval, as a main
time unit. There are a few reasons for this choice. First, it may take some time before
the effect of health spending shows up in mortality. Second, by reducing the number of
time periods, we can readily report the regression results in a table without making strong
assumptions about the time trend. Finally, because some variables may be missing for
some countries in some years, aggregation over time helps to retain most countries in the
analysis. As a result of this choice, the two decades of data are divided into the following
four lustra: 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009, and 2010–14, which we respectively denote
by l = 0, · · · , 3.
To introduce the regression-based triple difference estimator, we need additional no-
tations. Subscript c is used to denote a country. Vector of time-varying covariates and
country-level fixed-effects term are denoted by Xcl and Fc, respectively. For most of
our analysis, Xcl includes the logarithmic GDP per capita and the proportion of peo-
ple with access to improved water source. Denoting the time (lustrum) fixed effects by
I tl ≡ 1(t = l), the regression-based triple difference estimator can be written as follows:
LEABcl = α
0 + α1HESHcl + α
2PRHScl + α
3HESHcl · PRHScl
+
t=3∑
t=1
I tl ·
[
β0t + β
1
t HESHcl + β
2
t HESHcl + β
3
t HESHcl · PRHScl
]
+γXcl + Fc + cl, (1)
where HESH and PRHS are continuous variables on a unit interval, cl the error term,
and β3t the main coefficient of interest.
In Table 5, we report the regression results using a balanced panel data for 165 coun-
tries. To highlight the nature of our analysis, we start with Columns (1) and (2), which
respectively report the double difference estimates of the impact of the health expenditure
share on life expectancy at birth with and without covariates. The estimation equation
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Table 5: Baseline double and triple difference regressions.
Dep. var.: Life expectancy at birth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lustrum 1 (I1, Yr 2000-2004) 1.633*** 0.845** 1.554** 1.110*
(0.332) (0.344) (0.672) (0.619)
Lustrum 2 (I2, Yr 2005-2009) 3.782*** 2.159*** 4.127*** 3.227***
(0.519) (0.599) (0.954) (0.914)
Lustrum 3 (I3, Yr 2010-2014) 5.920*** 3.512*** 6.175*** 4.989***
(0.696) (0.866) (1.296) (1.208)
Health expenditure share 0.297 0.251 0.234 0.118
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.196) (0.173) (0.266) (0.242)
I1 × HESH 0.217 0.226 0.0881 0.0271
(0.165) (0.146) (0.222) (0.200)
I2 × HESH 0.134 0.190 -0.136 -0.138
(0.144) (0.133) (0.187) (0.165)
I3 × HESH 0.0701 0.177 -0.279 -0.240
(0.157) (0.150) (0.209) (0.185)
Private health expenditure -0.0192 -0.0101
share (PRHS, %) (0.0288) (0.0262)
I1 × PRHS -0.0198 -0.0155
(0.0235) (0.0203)
I2 × PRHS -0.0346 -0.0346**
(0.0217) (0.0172)
I3 × PRHS -0.0409 -0.0485*
(0.0308) (0.0257)
HESH× PRHS 0.000690 0.00244
(0.00531) (0.00480)
I1 × HESH× PRHS 0.00266 0.00410
(0.00390) (0.00348)
I2 × HESH× PRHS 0.00682* 0.00752**
(0.00348) (0.00304)
I3 × HESH× PRHS 0.0101** 0.0106***
(0.00454) (0.00396)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 1.208** 1.108**
(0.535) (0.515)
Share of population with access 0.146*** 0.132***
to improved water source (%) (0.0431) (0.0439)
Observations 660 660 660 660
R2 0.631 0.674 0.655 0.685
Number of countries 165 165 165 165
Note: Country fixed effects are included in each model. Standard errors clustered
for each country are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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for Column (2) in this case is the same as eq. (1) except that all the terms involving PRHS
are dropped. Column (1) further drops the term involving Xcl.
As the first three rows of the table shows, there is a secular increase in LEAB over
time. As the comparison between Columns (1) and (2) indicate, this increase can be
partly ascribed to the increase in the logarithmic GDP per capita and share of population
with improved water source. While all the coefficients on the terms involving HESH are
all positive, they are statistically insignificant. According to Column (2), an increase
of HESH by one percentage point is associated with about 0.2 years gain in LEAB.
Noting that HESH for a majority of countries ranges between 5 and 10 percent (See
Figure 2(a)), one percentage point increase in HESH is a sizable increase. Thus, a higher
health expenditure is associated with only a modest gain in health outcome at best.
Columns (3) and (4) provide the estimation results for eq. (1). As the coefficients β3t
on I tl ×HESH×PRHS for t ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicate, the marginal effect of health expenditure
is positive and significant for t = 2, 3. This suggest that the health promoting effect of
health spending tends to be higher when a higher share comes from the private source.
This finding is consistent with our na¨ıve triple difference estimator presented in Table 2
and we take Column (4) as our baseline result against which other results are compared.
Next, we consider the regression analogue of Tables 3 and 4 by restricting our sample
to the set of households in which the government effectiveness in each of the four lustra
is, respectively, always negative and positive. These results are reported, respectively, in
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. Consistent with Table 3, Column (1) shows that the
health promoting effect of health spending tends to be higher in countries with ineffective
governments when a higher share comes from a private source when t = 2, 3. However,
the point estimates are much smaller and insignificant in Column (2), indicating that
the private source is no better than public source in promoting health in countries with
efficient governments. In Column (3), we report the results of a regression based on the
two samples for Columns (1) and (2) combined. The results are similar to Column (4) of
Table 5 indicating that the omission of a small number of countries for which GE is not
observed or its sign changed over the four lustra did not alter the results much.
22
Table 6: Triple difference regression by the government efficiency.
Dep. var.: Life expectancy at birth (1) (2) (3)
Lustrum 1 (I1, Yr 2000-2004) 1.707 0.718 1.068
(1.207) (1.088) (0.670)
Lustrum 2 (I2, Yr 2005-2009) 5.784*** 2.402* 3.758***
(1.650) (1.357) (0.958)
Lustrum 3 (I3, Yr 2010-2014) 9.225*** 3.657** 5.879***
(2.172) (1.788) (1.276)
Health expenditure share 0.771* -0.0556 0.191
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.390) (0.260) (0.271)
I1 × HESH 0.374 0.0286 0.0922
(0.389) (0.235) (0.229)
I2 × HESH -0.139 0.0181 -0.151
(0.305) (0.202) (0.183)
I3 × HESH -0.446 -0.00511 -0.295
(0.375) (0.232) (0.203)
Private health expenditure 0.0342 -0.0404 -0.00742
share (PRHS, %) (0.0287) (0.0585) (0.0268)
I1 × PRHS 0.0189 -0.0320 -0.0113
(0.0282) (0.0602) (0.0219)
I2 × PRHS -0.0324 -0.0428 -0.0401**
(0.0240) (0.0569) (0.0177)
I3 × PRHS -0.0761** -0.0429 -0.0603**
(0.0375) (0.0686) (0.0264)
HESH× PRHS -0.00833 0.00880 0.00177
(0.00569) (0.00852) (0.00483)
I1 × HESH× PRHS -0.00137 0.00478 0.00335
(0.00523) (0.00673) (0.00353)
I2 × HESH× PRHS 0.00834* 0.00364 0.00814***
(0.00453) (0.00626) (0.00307)
I3 × HESH× PRHS 0.0155** 0.00407 0.0121***
(0.00616) (0.00705) (0.00399)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 1.279* 1.511* 1.327**
(0.694) (0.858) (0.556)
Share of population with access 0.123** 0.109 0.136***
to improved water source (%) (0.0486) (0.118) (0.0456)
Observations 344 256 600
R2 0.700 0.735 0.690
Number of countries 86 64 150
Note: Country fixed effects are included in each model. Standard errors
clustered for each country are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗
denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Column (1) [column (2)] uses only the countries in which the government
efficiency is on average negative [positive] in each of the four lustra. Col-
umn (3) uses all the countries included either in column (1) or column (2).
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Robustness Checks
In Tables 5 and 6, we treated each country equally and only considered LEAB as the
health outcome variable of interest. While we believe that these are reasonable choices
because our unit of analysis throughout the paper is a country rather than an individual
and because LEAB reflects the health of all individuals in the country, some robustness
checks are warranted.
In Column (1) of Table 7, we report the same regression as the baseline results re-
ported in Column (4) of Table 5 except that observations are weighted by the average
population over the four lustra. The results are similar and β32 and β
3
3 remain significant.
In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7, we report the regressions of LEAB for males and
females separately. As can be seen form Table 7, the point estimates remain similar.
One concern about the triple difference estimates presented so far is the potential
endogeneity issue. That is, when people live longer, they would generally allocate a
higher share of expenditure to health. Further, depending on what is covered in private
and public sources of health spending, this increase in health spending may potentially
affect the private share in health spending if, for example, older people are more likely
to depend on public sources. Given that the health financing system is diverse across
countries, we do not have a strong reason to believe that this potential endogeneity issue
would substantially bias our triple difference estimator in a particular direction. However,
it is also difficult to exclude this possibility.
A standard approach to address the endogeneity issue is to use instrumental variables.
Unfortunately, we do not have compelling instruments to suit our purpose. Therefore,
we instead use the logarithm of under-five child mortality (LU5MR) as an alternative
dependent variable. An advantage of using LU5MR is that the endogeneity concern is
much weaker; it is unlikely that a higher share of health spending comes from private
sources just because their children are less likely to die.
In Column (4) of Table 7, we report the result of a regression in which the dependent
variable is replaced by LU5MR in the baseline regression. Because the healthier popula-
tion would have lower mortality, we would expect that the signs are the opposite of the
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Table 7: Alternative specifications for robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable LEAB LEAB LEAB LU5MR
(Weighted) Male Female
Lustrum 1 (I1, Yr 2000-2004) 0.687 0.644 1.600** -0.165**
(1.079) (0.608) (0.687) (0.0767)
Lustrum 2 (I2, Yr 2005-2009) 4.336*** 2.551*** 3.936*** -0.257**
(1.344) (0.941) (0.963) (0.130)
Lustrum 3 (I3, Yr 2010-2014) 5.550*** 4.253*** 5.755*** -0.448***
(1.570) (1.255) (1.236) (0.169)
Health expenditure share 0.116 0.0163 0.224 0.00496
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.293) (0.240) (0.257) (0.0259)
I1 × HESH 0.182 0.00730 0.0466 0.00737
(0.281) (0.197) (0.214) (0.0202)
I2 × HESH -0.0829 -0.119 -0.158 0.00484
(0.244) (0.163) (0.178) (0.0158)
I3 × HESH -0.0832 -0.198 -0.285 0.00936
(0.237) (0.183) (0.199) (0.0182)
Private health expenditure -0.000232 -0.0201 0.000339 -0.000922
share (PRHS, %) (0.0320) (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.00316)
I1 × PRHS 0.00745 -0.0178 -0.0133 -0.000302
(0.0280) (0.0206) (0.0217) (0.00254)
I2 × PRHS -0.0279 -0.0353** -0.0339* -0.000570
(0.0281) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.00221)
I3 × PRHS -0.0306 -0.0510* -0.0462* -0.000232
(0.0311) (0.0261) (0.0270) (0.00310)
HESH× PRHS 0.00724 0.00395 0.000877 -9.04e-05
(0.00621) (0.00480) (0.00501) (0.000499)
I1 × HESH× PRHS 0.00523 0.00447 0.00374 -0.000167
(0.00475) (0.00363) (0.00351) (0.000398)
I2 × HESH× PRHS 0.00891* 0.00747** 0.00758** -0.000270
(0.00460) (0.00315) (0.00310) (0.000324)
I3 × HESH× PRHS 0.00907* 0.0105** 0.0108*** -0.000330
(0.00479) (0.00413) (0.00399) (0.000426)
Logarithmic GDP per capita -1.035 1.233** 0.972* -0.247***
(0.679) (0.521) (0.523) (0.0640)
Share of population with access 0.186*** 0.129*** 0.135*** -0.00603**
to improved water source (%) (0.0521) (0.0406) (0.0479) (0.00261)
Observations 660 660 660 660
R2 0.845 0.701 0.658 0.832
Number of countries 165 165 165 165
Note: LEAB and LU5MR stand for life expectancy at birth and logarithm of under-
five mortality rate, respectively. Country fixed effects are included in each model.
Standard errors clustered for each country are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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baseline regression. Column (4) shows that this is indeed the case for the triple difference
estimators β3 (i.e., coefficients on I × HESH × PRHS) and almost all other covariates.
While the triple different estimator is not statistically significant, the results based on
LEAB and LU5MR are broadly consistent. Therefore, the bias due to the endogeneity of
HESH and PRHS are unlikely to be the main driver of our results.6
As a further robustness check, we performed baseline regressions with potentially im-
portant additional covariates to see whether our results are driven by omitted variables.
Namely, we included (1) the number of physicians per 1,000 people, (2) share of popula-
tion with access to improved sanitation facilities, (3) share of urban population, and (4)
secondary school enrollment rates as the additional covariate and these regression results
are reported in Table 9 in the Appendix. The results are similar both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
Finally, we also included the quadratic terms for PRHS to see if we can infer about the
optimal private health share. However, the coefficient on the quadratic term is generally
insignificant and its sign changes over different lustra, which may be due to the high
collinearity between the linear and quadratic terms. This is true even when we split the
sample into low- and high-GE countries.
Linear time trend
So far, our results are based on the data aggregated over each lustrum. This formulation
has an advantage that we can present the results in a table without making too restrictive
assumptions. However, we can potentially obtain sharper results if we are willing to make
a linear time trend assumption. To see the validity of this assumption, we first conduct a
F -test of the linear trend with the following null hypothesis based on eq. (1):
6Ideally, private share of health spending should be based on the health spending for children under
five when LU5MR is used as the dependent variable. However, such data are not readily available to
our knowledge. The closest we can find is the private share in human capital spending taken from the
National Transfer Accounts (http://www.ntaccounts.org/ accessed on August 8, 2017), which is based
on per capita health spending for children age 0-17 and per capita education spending for children age
3-26. With this data set, we can only construct a panel data for two years for 18 countries. When we
run a regression of the linear time trend model in eq. (3) discussed below, we obtain results that are
qualitatively similar to Column (4) of Table 7.
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H0 : β
j
1 = β
j
2/2 = β
j
3/3 for ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (2)
In each of the regressions presented above for which we can carry out this test (i.e.,
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 and all columns in Table 6), we failed to reject the
null hypothesis even at a 10 percent level. We have also run a regression similar to
Column (4) of Table 5 using annual data and using year instead of lustrum as the time
unit of analysis. As a result, the running variable t in the summation goes from 1 (year
1996) to 19 (year 2014). The point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval of β0t to
β3t for t ∈ {1, · · · , 19} are, respectively, presented in Figures 3 (a) to (d).
Figure 3 (a) shows that there is a clear positive secular time trend. Figures 3 (b) and
(c) show that the point estimates of the impact of HESH and PRHS are mostly negative
but insignificant. Figure 3 (d) shows that the triple difference estimator is positive and
significant at t = 9 (year 2004) onwards. Therefore, Figure 3 is consistent with the results
presented so far and indicates that the use of the following model with a linear time trend
is reasonable:
LEABct = α
0 + α1HESHct + α
2PRHSct + α
3HESHct · PRHSct
+
[
β0 + β1HESHct + β
2HESHct + β
3HESHct · PRHSct
]
t
+γXct + Fc + ct, (3)
Table 8 presents the regressions based on eq. (3). The main coefficient of interest is
the coefficient β3 on HESH × PRHS × t, which is an analogue of the triple difference
estimator. Column (1) uses all the available observations for which GE is also observed.
Columns (2) and (3) use only the countries in which GE in the first year of observations is
negative and positive, respectively.7 Column (4) can be regarded as quadruple difference
specification in which GE and its interaction terms are additionally included.
The linear trend models are qualitatively consistent with previously shown results. In
7Note that GE is available only from the year 1996.
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Table 8: Linear trend models.
Dep. var.: Life expectancy at birth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Health expenditure share 0.157 0.553*** -0.225* 0.233**
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.0987) (0.156) (0.130) (0.109)
HESH× t -0.0194*** -0.0527*** 0.0134** -0.0235***
(0.00530) (0.00949) (0.00639) (0.00624)
Private health expenditure 0.00525 0.0398** -0.0449** 0.0164
share (PRHS, %) (0.0115) (0.0156) (0.0216) (0.0138)
PRHS× t -0.00167** -0.00471*** 0.00228* -0.00233***
(0.000727) (0.00105) (0.00117) (0.000832)
HESH× PRHS -0.000295 -0.00777*** 0.00927*** -0.000690
(0.00182) (0.00266) (0.00307) (0.00213)
HESH× PRHS× t 0.000443*** 0.00108*** -0.000493*** 0.000459***
(0.000109) (0.000167) (0.000160) (0.000124)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 0.640*** 0.251 1.539*** 0.459**
(0.198) (0.255) (0.331) (0.203)
Share of population with access 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.0965*** 0.111***
to improved water source (%) (0.00997) (0.0124) (0.0233) (0.0102)
Government effectiveness (GE) 1.657**
(0.683)
GE× t -0.151***
(0.0427)
GE×HESH -0.275***
(0.0952)
GE×HESH× t 0.0258***
(0.00552)
GE× PRHS -0.0203
(0.0133)
GE× PRHS× t 0.00202**
(0.000859)
GE×HESH× PRHS 0.00703***
(0.00188)
GE×HESH× PRHS× t -0.000531***
(0.000111)
Observations 2,719 1,631 1,088 2,719
R2 0.984 0.976 0.975 0.984
Number of countries 178 108 70 178
Note: All countries are used in Columns (1) and (4). Column (2) [Column (3)] uses a
subsample of countries in which GE is negative [positive] in the year 1996. Country fixed
effects are included in each model. Standard errors clustered for each country are reported
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
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particular, the coefficientβ3 on HESH×PRHS×t is positive and significant in Columns (1)
and (2) as with the previous results. On the other hand, we find that β3 is negative and
significant in Column (3). This result is also consistent with what we found in Table 4.
However, the sign changes and statistical significance disappears once we restrict our
sample to the set of middle income countries as reported in Table 10 in the Appendix.
Nevertheless, Column (3) provides no evidence contradicting with our earlier finding that
private sources are no better than public sources in promoting health in countries with
effective governments.
Finally, the coefficient on GE × HESH × PRHS × t, which is essentially a quadruple
difference estimator, is negative and significant, indicating that the private sources tends
to have an even higher health promoting effect than public sources in countries where the
government is not effective.
Because GE is strongly corrected with the income level, our results that are based on
low- and high-GE countries may be partly driven by the heterogeneous impacts of private
and public health spending across different income levels. To address this concern, we
also redo the same analysis as Table 8 only with middle income countries. As shown in
Table 10 in the Appendix, the qualitative nature of the results remain mostly unchanged.
That is, the triple difference estimator (the coefficient β3 on HESH×PRHS× t is positive
and significant when a sample of all countries or only low-GE countries is used. However,
this is not the case for the high-GE country. Further, the quadruple difference estimator
(the coefficient on GE×HESH×PRHS× t) is negative, even though it is not significant.
6 Discussion
Using a panel data set with two decades of observations for a large number of coun-
tries, we have investigated the differential impacts of private and public sources of health
expenditure on health outcomes. To our knowledge, this is the first study that clearly
distinguishes private and public sources of health spending to analyze health outcomes
systematically using the triple difference estimation approach. Our main finding is that
private health spending on average has a stronger health-promoting effect than public
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health spending. Therefore, our results indicate that taking advantage of private sources
of health expenditure is important. This implication is important not only in develop-
ing countries where resources are generally scarce but also in rich countries where health
spending share is likely to increase as their societies age. Our result is robust with respect
to the choice of health outcome indicator and inclusion of various covariates and unlikely
to be driven by the potential endogeneity of the private health share.
We also find that the differential health impacts of private and public health spending
depend on the quality of the government. In fact, our main results are driven by the
presence of countries with ineffective governments. Once we restrict our sample to a set
of countries with effective governments, we find no evidence that private sources have a
higher health-promoting effect than public sources. Therefore, our results indicate that
a larger involvement of private sector in health is desirable particularly where ineffective
government has to be taken as given. However, in countries where there is an effective
government, we caution against over-reliance on private health sources because some of
our results (e.g., column (3) of Table 8) suggests that public sources of health spending
have a higher health-promoting effect than private sources, even though this results is
suggestive at best.
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Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 9 is the same as Column (4) of Table 5 except that an additional covariate is
included in each column. Table 10 uses the same specifications as Table 8 but is based
on a subsample of middle income countries.
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Table 9: Triple difference regressions with additional regressors.
Dep. var.: Life expectancy at birth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lustrum 1 (I1, Yr 2000-2004) 0.784 1.077* 1.034* 0.702
(0.667) (0.625) (0.621) (0.760)
Lustrum 2 (I2, Yr 2005-2009) 3.492*** 3.217*** 3.117*** 2.268**
(0.953) (0.913) (0.895) (1.053)
Lustrum 3 (I3, Yr 2010-2014) 4.851*** 5.046*** 4.747*** 3.401**
(1.261) (1.215) (1.186) (1.307)
Health expenditure share 0.224 0.118 0.130 -0.131
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.224) (0.255) (0.237) (0.279)
I1 ×HESH 0.196 0.0284 0.0373 -0.119
(0.180) (0.212) (0.196) (0.231)
I2 ×HESH -0.0387 -0.141 -0.133 -0.199
(0.141) (0.180) (0.163) (0.196)
I3 ×HESH -0.0934 -0.249 -0.228 -0.230
(0.165) (0.204) (0.181) (0.223)
Private health expenditure 0.0136 -0.00973 -0.00496 -0.0433
share (PRHS, %) (0.0275) (0.0267) (0.0257) (0.0323)
I1 × PRHS 0.0123 -0.0147 -0.0114 -0.0379
(0.0220) (0.0212) (0.0199) (0.0255)
I2 × PRHS -0.0145 -0.0343* -0.0328* -0.0501**
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0170) (0.0237)
I3 × PRHS -0.0180 -0.0495* -0.0469* -0.0573*
(0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0255) (0.0314)
HESH× PRHS -0.000895 0.00239 0.00197 0.00816
(0.00437) (0.00487) (0.00474) (0.00595)
I1 ×HESH× PRHS -0.000427 0.00406 0.00380 0.00682
(0.00300) (0.00361) (0.00338) (0.00456)
I2 ×HESH× PRHS 0.00440* 0.00757** 0.00751** 0.00891**
(0.00250) (0.00335) (0.00302) (0.00421)
I3 ×HESH× PRHS 0.00644* 0.0108** 0.0105*** 0.0109**
(0.00372) (0.00444) (0.00394) (0.00491)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 0.983* 1.105** 1.159** 1.070*
(0.513) (0.496) (0.538) (0.630)
Share of population with access 0.119*** 0.131*** 0.123*** 0.128**
to improved water source (%) (0.0404) (0.0485) (0.0464) (0.0562)
Number of physicians -0.141
to per 1,000 people (0.196)
Share of population with access 0.00189
to improved sanitation facilities (%) (0.0332)
Share of urban population (%) 0.0719
(0.0526)
Secondary school enrollment rate (%) 0.0174
(0.0124)
Observations 601 654 660 584
R2 0.710 0.684 0.688 0.687
Number of countries 165 164 165 161
Note: Country fixed effects are included in each model. Standard errors clustered
for each country are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Linear trend models, middle income countries only.
Dep. var.: Life expectancy at birth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Health expenditure share 0.473*** 0.576*** 0.344 0.425***
in GDP (HESH, %) (0.122) (0.107) (0.389) (0.142)
HESH× t -0.0358*** -0.0413*** -0.0304 -0.0296***
(0.00740) (0.00637) (0.0253) (0.00969)
Private health expenditure 0.0392** 0.0459*** 0.0211 0.0364*
share (PRHS, %) (0.0155) (0.0128) (0.0566) (0.0188)
PRHS× t -0.00414*** -0.00453*** -0.00434 -0.00355***
(0.00105) (0.000872) (0.00404) (0.00135)
HESH× PRHS -0.00667*** -0.0103*** 0.00118 -0.00562**
(0.00240) (0.00207) (0.00817) (0.00281)
HESH× PRHS× t 0.000652*** 0.000825*** 0.000496 0.000504**
(0.000162) (0.000135) (0.000635) (0.000209)
Logarithmic GDP per capita 0.302 -0.216 1.408* 0.217
(0.270) (0.240) (0.829) (0.289)
Share of population with access -0.0402*** -0.0439*** -0.102** -0.0438***
to improved water source (%) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0480) (0.0146)
Government effectiveness (GE) 0.711
(1.512)
GE× t -0.0672
(0.109)
GE×HESH -0.304
(0.244)
GE×HESH× t 0.0220
(0.0175)
GE× PRHS -0.0254
(0.0335)
GE× PRHS× t 0.00206
(0.00249)
GE×HESH× PRHS 0.00774
(0.00518)
GE×HESH× PRHS× t -0.000577
(0.000385)
Observations 1,343 900 443 1,343
R2 0.981 0.989 0.956 0.981
Number of countries 121 82 23 121
Note: All countries are used in Columns (1) and (4). Column (2) [Column (3)] uses
a subsample of countries in which GE is negative [positive] in the year 1996. Country
fixed effects are included in each model. Standard errors clustered for each country are
reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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